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TOWARD AN UNCONDITIONAL RIGHT  
TO VOTE FOR PERSONS WITH MENTAL 
DISABILITIES: RECONCILING STATE LAW 
WITH CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEES 
Ryan Kelley* 
Abstract: Casting a ballot is a primary form of community participation 
in the United States. This exercise provides citizens with a means to safe-
guard their legal rights and effectuate change. Nevertheless, some citi-
zens, such as people with mental disabilities, are often denied this fun-
damental right solely based upon their status. These citizens have faced a 
long history of pernicious discrimination at the hands of their communi-
ties, legislators, and even the courts. Yet, social policy has begun to evolve 
in light of more nuanced understandings of mental disabilities. This 
knowledge has also spurred the reform of state and federal law. While the 
prospect of change looms high, in the context of voting, some states lag 
behind and recent jurisprudence demands that they reform voter eligibil-
ity requirements. This Note calls for all states to ensure that the right to 
vote is a presumptive right of the mentally disabled, to facilitate its exer-
cise, and to deny it by a clear and fair standard that only excludes the 
mentally incapacitated when there is a clear lack of understanding of the 
nature and effect of voting. 
Introduction 
 Liz Glenn is a forty-four year old woman living in Quincy, Massa-
chusetts.1 She commutes to work daily at a catering and gift establish-
ment, and she attends church and socializes with friends on the week-
ends.2 She is an active member of her community, and like all members, 
she faces the challenges life throws her.3 Liz is mentally retarded, a 
quadriplegic, has use of only one arm, and uses an electric wheelchair.4 
                                                                                                                      
* Senior Articles Editor, Boston College Third World Law Journal (2009–2010). 
1 The Arc of Mass., Meet Liz Glenn: A Person Making it in the Community, http:// 
www.arcmass.org/MeetLizGlenn/tabid/353/Default.aspx (last visited Mar. 23, 2010). 
2 See id. 
3 See id. 
4 See id. 
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She has been found unable to protect herself from harm without assis-
tance by reason of physical disability.5 
 L.C. is a thirty-one year old woman living in a state institution in 
Georgia.6 She loves to draw and write.7 She suffers from schizophrenia 
and lives with mild mental retardation.8 L.C. has lived for more than 
half her life in state-run institutions despite the fact that, at least once, 
professional staff has determined she could be appropriately served in 
a community residential setting and that her presence in an acute psy-
chiatric unit was harmful to her habilitation.9 
 Liz and L.C. share much in common.10 Each has unique interests 
and talents; each is dealing with the challenges life sends them one by 
one.11 Each also has a disability—mental retardation.12 However, these 
women’s stories diverge in one key way.13 Although Liz Glen’s commu-
nity has resolved to ensure that her disability does not preclude her 
from participating fully, L.C.’s community has used her disability as a 
reason to exclude her from such participation.14 
 Across the United States, communities today are guilty of discrimi-
natorily excluding people like L.C. from voting, a fundamental area of 
civic participation.15 Although voting can best be understood as a right 
“preservative of all rights,” many states have formally barred persons 
with mental disabilities from exercising the right of suffrage through 
their constitution or statutes.16 Communities often amplify this exclu-
sion through informal barriers, such as refusing assistance to those in 
need.17 The ability “to exercise legal rights and to have a voice in gov-
                                                                                                                      
5 See id. 
6 Brief of Respondent at 5–6, Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581 (1999) (No. 98-536), 1999 
WL 144128, at *5–*6. 
7 See id. 
8 Id. 
9 See id. 
10 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5–6; The Arc of Mass., supra note 1. 
11 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5–6; The Arc of Mass., supra note 1. 
12 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5–6; The Arc of Mass., supra note 1. 
13 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5–6; The Arc of Mass., supra note 1. 
14 See Brief of Respondent, supra note 6, at 5–6; The Arc of Mass., supra note 1. 
15 See Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 525 (2004); Adam Winkler, Note, Expressive Vot-
ing, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 330, 336–337, 337 n.26 (1993). 
16 See Pamela S. Karlan, Framing the Voting Rights Claims of Cognitively Impaired Individu-
als, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 917, 919–23 (2007); Michael E. Waterstone, Lane, Fundamental 
Rights, and Voting, 56 Ala. L. Rev. 793, 836 (2005). 
17 See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 553, 561–62 (1964) (striking down inequality in state 
senate representation on the principle of “one person, one vote”); Karlan, supra note 16, at 
922–23 (2007); Waterstone, supra note 16, at 825–28. One commentator remarked, 
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ernment” are core elements of democracy.18 Without access to their 
own political or governmental system, the mentally disabled are surrep-
titiously denied these rights and branded as outsiders.19 
 “When a single person, who has not broken any laws, is excluded 
from the mainstream . . . of community life, all of society becomes vul-
nerable.”20 Throughout history, persons with mental disabilities have 
been systematically denied fundamental personal rights and thereby 
precluded from full and functional participation in society.21 Beginning 
in 1898, states sought to enact legislation providing for the compulsory 
sterilization of persons with mental disabilities.22 Fear and societal dis-
dain led to the exclusion of most individuals with disabilities from edu-
                                                                                                                      
It is . . . surprising to discover that the Supreme Court has evidenced in its 
right-to-vote jurisprudence what may be characterized as a limited view of the 
value of voting. The Court tends to rely implicitly on an “instrumental” view 
of the franchise in which voting is seen solely as a societal tool for exerting 
political power. 
Winkler, supra note 15, at 330–31. This “instrumental” view narrowly places the core value 
of suffrage on the act of casting a vote and having it counted. See Michael Waterstone, Con-
stitutional and Statutory Voting Rights for People with Disabilities, 14 Stan. L. & Pol’y Rev. 353, 
364–65 (2003). Even under a strict “instrumentalist” view, the right to vote is critical. See id. 
Aside from this legal hurdle, Karlan noted that informal barriers could be established 
based upon public officials making on-the-spot judgments about voter eligibility, the ab-
sence of affirmative accommodations for those in need (for example, assistance for the 
illiterate), and individual private caregivers who often serve as “gatekeepers to the outside 
world” for the disabled community. See Karlan, supra note 16, at 922–23. 
18 See Laura F. Rothstein & Julia Rothstein, Disabilities and the Law 652 (3d 
ed. 2006). 
19 See id.; Bruce Dennis Sales et al., Disabled Persons and the Law: State Legis-
lative Issues 5 ( Joel Feinberg et al. eds., 1982). 
20 Susan Stainback & William Stainback, Inclusive Schooling, in Support Networks for 
Inclusive Schooling 3, 7 (William Stainback & Susan Stainback eds., 1990). 
21 Sales et al., supra note 19, at 5. 
22 Robert L. Hayman, Jr., The Smart Culture: Society, Intelligence, and Law 
243 (1998). The Supreme Court had upheld the practice ostensibly reasoning that sacri-
fice was a civic duty. See Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200, 207 (1927). Justice Oliver Wendell 
Holmes for the Court stated: 
We have seen more than once that public welfare may call upon the best citi-
zens for their lives. It would be strange if it could not call upon those who al-
ready sap the strength of the State for these lesser sacrifices, often not felt to 
be such by those concerned, in order to prevent our being swamped with in-
competence. It is better for all the world, if instead of waiting to execute de-
generate offspring for crime, or to let them starve for their imbecility, society 
can prevent those who are manifestly unfit from continuing their kind. The 
principle that sustains compulsory vaccination is broad enough to cover cut-
ting the Fallopian tubes. Three generations of imbeciles are enough. 
Id. (citing Jacobson v. Massachusetts, 197 U.S. 11 (1905)) 
362 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:359 
cation until the nineteenth century.23 Some philanthropic efforts later 
established “asylums” for children with disabilities through which they 
gained some education at the expense of being alienated from com-
munity life.24 This history of discrimination does not limit itself to edu-
cation, in fact, prejudice persists in the areas of employment, health 
care, insurance and family law.25 Even today, many individuals with 
mental disabilities remain wards of state, locked in segregated institu-
tions and prevented from participating in community life.26 
 Along with this grim history of pervasive and systematic isolation, 
segregation, and discrimination, persons with mental disabilities have 
faced unique challenges in their battle for civil rights.27 First, the very 
definition of disability is a source of controversy.28 While many believe 
that the problems persons with disabilities face arise from internal char-
acteristics, a growing portion of the disabled community finds that those 
problems actually come from their external environment.29 By focusing 
solely on the organic impairment, the non-disabled tend to be unaware 
of the extent that social perception and environment can contribute to 
the disability.30 In addition, disabled people lack a sense of shared his-
tory that has helped some minority groups “disseminat[e] . . . informa-
tion about prejudice and oppression.”31 Until the disability rights 
movement, many could not overcome feelings of humiliation and 
                                                                                                                      
23 Ruth Colker, Anti-Subordination Above All: A Disability Perspective, 82 Notre Dame L. 
Rev. 1415, 1423–24 (2007). 
24 See id. Even when compulsory education laws forced public schools to accept chil-
dren with disabilities, they were segregated by classroom or school. See id. at 1425–26. 
Large public schools arose in urban areas of the United States at the start of the nine-
teenth century and later adopted grade placement through which ungraded classes were 
soon created for the “uncooperative, or unsuccessful” See id. Consequently, by 1932, sev-
enty-five thousand children with mental retardation were segregated in public schools. Id. 
25 Susan Stefan, Unequal Rights: Discrimination Against People with Dis-
abilities and the Americans with Disabilities Act 4, 19–22 (2001). 
26 Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581(1999) (holding unjustified institutionalization is dis-
crimination based on disability). 
27 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101(a)(2), (3), (5) (2006); Olmstead, 527 U.S. at 608 (Kennedy, J., 
concurring); Harlan Hahn, Accommodations and the ADA: Unreasonable Bias or Biased Rea-
soning?, in Backlash Against the ADA Reinterpreting Disability Rights 26, 28–31 
(Linda Hamilton Kreiger ed., 2003) (distinguishing challenges faced by the disability 
rights movement from those experienced by African Americans and women). 
28 See Hahn, supra note 27, at 28, 32–35. 
29 See id. at 28. 
30 See id. 
31 Id. at 36. 
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shame, thus preventing them from drawing upon their own experiences 
to investigate broader patterns of oppression.32 
 Inspired by the examples of the African-American civil rights and 
women’s rights movements, which experienced great victories in the 
late 1960s, the disability rights movements began to take root in the 
1970s.33 Advocacy arose in response to historical practices of segrega-
tion.34 Thus a key focal point was institutionalization, a tool used to both 
“hide and degrade individuals with disabilities” under the guise of pro-
viding them with treatment.35 The practice of institutionalization fur-
ther estranged the disabled from their community by impeding their 
right to vote and, in some cases, disenfranchising them because of their 
residence in facilities.36 Accordingly, advocates have focused their efforts 
on de-institutionalization and integration.37 
 While the disability rights movement has progressed on several 
fronts—including ensuring persons with disabilities opportunities for 
employment, education and defining further their rights—the funda-
mental right to vote remains egregiously undervalued and abused.38 
Although federal and state constitutions protect voting, “a hallmark of 
                                                                                                                      
32 Id. Hahn’s notion can be gleaned from personal testimonies given in reflection on 
living with a disability prior to the movement. See Nat’l Council on Disability, Voices 
of Freedom: America Speaks Out on the ADA 23–24 (1995). Disabled persons testified 
that they felt like prisoners in their own homes, burdened, and suffered anxiety with re-
gard to asking for assistance. See id. Mental disability advocate Susan Stefan considered the 
complex nature of discrimination against person with mental disabilities, noting: 
Discrimination is not only occasioned by psychiatric disability, it can cause 
disability. It is like an infection striking and already vulnerable and struggling 
soul. . . . Discrimination saps people’s strength and their ability to struggle 
through each day—hence causing the very depression, hopelessness, anxie-
ties, and suspicions that become the basis for further discrimination. 
Stefan, supra note 25, at xiii–xiv. 
33 David Frum, How We Got Here: The 70s, the Decade that Brought You Mod-
ern Life (for Better or Worse) 250–51 (2000). 
34 See Colker, supra note 23, at 1419. 
35 See id. 
36 See id. 
37 See id. Deinstitutionalization is “the release of institutionalized individuals (as mental 
patients) from institutional care to care in the community.” Webster’s New Collegiate 
Dictionary 335 (9th ed. 1991). 
38 See 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (2006); Colker, supra note 23, at 1430–34; Developments in the 
Law—the Law of Mental Illness, VII. Voting Rights and the Mentally Incapacitated, 121 Harv. L. 
Rev. 1179, 1181–85 (2008) [hereinafter Developments in the Law]; see also Wesberry v. Sand-
ers, 376 U.S. 1, 17 (1964) (holding a Georgia apportionment statute to be unconstitutional 
and reasoning that “[n]o right is more precious in a free country than that of having a 
voice in the election of those who make the laws under which, as good citizens, we must 
live”). 
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our democracy”, there are limits on this right.39 Notably, states are al-
lowed to define who is eligible to vote and manage the election proc-
ess.40 A 2000 study found that forty-four states disenfranchised the men-
tally incompetent, some by constitution and some by statute.41 Though 
denial of the right of suffrage may be constitutionally and statutorily 
sound, when an individual is mentally incapacitated, indiscriminate 
denial due to some mental incapacity should not be tolerated.42 Modern 
policies, enlightened by a contemporary understanding of disability 
and more developed structured capacity assessments, accept that a ba-
sic understanding of the nature and effect of voting is a sufficient stan-
dard to establish the capacity to vote.43 
 In response to zealous advocacy on the part of disability advocates, 
several states have begun to consider efforts that would ensure the right 
to vote for persons with mental disabilities.44 State constitutions have 
been amended and election laws have been adopted to limit the effect 
of constitutional provisions which categorically deny this group suf-
frage.45 While successes are being achieved incrementally, discrimina-
tory language persists in state constitutions, and several states still main-
tain elections laws that violate the federal constitutional guarantee of 
equal protection under the law.46 
                                                                                                                      
39 Sally Bach Hurme & Paul S. Appelbaum, Defining and Assessing Capacity to Vote: The 
Effect of Mental Impairment on the Rights of Voters, 28 McGeorge L. Rev. 931, 931 (2007); see 
Wesberry, 376 U.S. at 17 (concluding that Article I, Section 2 of the Constitution “gives per-
sons qualified to vote a constitutional right to vote and to have their vote counted”); Devel-
opments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1181–85. 
40 See U.S. Const. art. I, § 2, cl. 1; art. II, § 1; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 
931. 
41 Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1181. 
42 See National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. 103–31, § 8, 107 Stat. 77, 83 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1973gg–6 (2006)) (providing states can exclude indi-
viduals from registering to vote by reason of mental incapacity); Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., 
Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 808–09, 812 (8th Cir. 2007). While states may exclude the 
mentally incapacitated, they cannot exclude those with sufficient mental capacity to vote. Cf. 
Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808–09 (noting categorical prohibition of a ward from voting would 
not withstand close equal protection scrutiny). 
43 See, eg., Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5) (2009); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (2008); 
Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 56 (D. Me. 2001) (holding Maine’s constitutional and 
statutory provisions unconstitutionally excluded voters by reason of mental disability); Paul 
Appelbaum et al., The Capacity to Vote of Person’s with Alzheimer’s Disease, 162 Am. J. Psychia-
try 2094, 2099 (2005); Thomas Grisso & Paul S. Appelbaum, Comparison of Standards for 
Assessing Patient Capacity to Make Treatment Decisions, 152 Am. J. Psychiatry 1033, 1037 
(1995). 
44 Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1182. 
45 See id. at 1183–84. 
46 U.S. Const. amend. XIV; see Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Developments in the Law, supra 
note 38, at 1181–85. 
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 Federal laws have also attempted to address the challenges faced 
by persons with mental disabilities.47 The Americans with Disabilities 
Act of 1990 (ADA) is perhaps the most recent major civil rights stat-
ute.48 Despite achieving this legislative success, disabled persons have 
not experienced forceful judicial successes similar to those seen by Af-
rican Americans and women during the Civil Rights Era of the 1960s.49 
Moreover, an unsettled definition of disability, pervasive discrimination, 
and a general skepticism of the ADA itself plague ADA plaintiffs.50 
 The short-comings of the ADA led Congress to enact the ADA 
Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), which went into effect January 1, 
2009.51 The ADAAA aims to broaden the class of persons protected by 
the ADA and to strengthen the effect of such protection by giving 
courts express instructions on statutory interpretation.52 The effects of 
this legislation remain to be seen, but court precedent under the origi-
nal ADA may pose a continued challenge to achieving the purposes 
intended by the new ADAAA.53 If these enhancements of the act are 
given full effect, Title II, which protects the right to vote from discrimi-
nation as a service, program or activity provided by a public entity, 
could serve as a powerful tool for restoring the franchise to persons 
with mental disabilities.54 
 This Note will argue that persons with mental disabilities have a 
presumptive right to vote—the use of which should be facilitated rather 
than impaired. States that exclude those who lack capacity to vote 
should only rely upon a judicial finding of such incapacity to ensure 
equal protection and due process. Part I will introduce the law of elec-
tions and survey the current status of state law concerning voter eligibil-
ity for mentally disabled persons. Part II will discuss the national trend 
                                                                                                                      
47 See, e.g., Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 328 
(1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213 (2006)); Help America Vote Act of 
2002, Pub. L. No. 107–252, 116 Stat. 1666 (2002) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. 
§ 15301); National Voter Registration Act of 1993, Pub. L. No. 103–31, 107 Stat. 77 (1993) 
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1973gg–10). 
48 See Anita Silvers & Leslie Pickering Francis, A New Start on the Road Not Taken: Driving 
with Lane to Head Off Disability-Based Denials of Rights, 23 Wash. U. J. L. & Pol’y 33, 33 
(2007). 
49 See id. 
50 Id. 
51 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–325 (2008), §§ 1, 2, 8, 
122 Stat. 3553, 3553–3554, 3559 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213). 
52 See id. §§ 2, 4. 
53 See Bd. of Tr. of Univ. of Ala. v. Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 370, 374 (2001) (holding Title 
I of the ADA unconstitutional to the extent which it allowed private citizens to sue states 
for money damages). 
54 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132; Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1185–89. 
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in the contemporary understanding of mental disability. It will examine 
the federal and state legislation that is moving in the direction of 
broadening the exercise of the right of suffrage and guarding against 
discrimination of those with mental disabilities by states in their ad-
ministration of elections. Part III will use recent cases to demonstrate 
that despite this hopeful reform, some states cling to policies that vio-
late the constitutional rights of citizens with mental disabilities and 
must be held accountable for this wrong. This Note will conclude that 
states should facilitate the right to vote of those with mental disabilities 
and that if states declare the mentally incapacitated ineligible, they 
should do so only after a court has determined the incapacity by a clear 
and fair standard for the sake of our national guarantee of equal pro-
tection under the law. 
I. The Law of Elections: State Law and Its Effect on the Voting 
Rights of Persons with Mental Disabilities 
 The Supreme Court has generally expressed an “instrumentalist” 
view of the significance of the right to vote under which the right is 
characterized by an “ability to cast a ballot and to have that ballot 
counted.”55 Although the Court’s interpretation establishes the funda-
mental nature of the right to vote, this limited definition grants states 
broad authority to administer elections in the manner they see fit.56 This 
administrative license has led some states to adopt eligibility criteria that 
plainly discriminates against mentally disabled individuals who would 
otherwise be qualified to vote.57 Furthermore, from state to state and 
even within each state’s various sources of law, inconsistent and often 
archaic terminology leads to ambiguity and amplifies the potential for 
discrimination—a problem that increased clarity of definition and un-
derstanding could dispel.58 
                                                                                                                      
55 See Waterstone, supra note 17, at 364–65. 
56 See id.; Winkler, supra note 15, at 336–37, 337 n.26. 
57 See Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1181–85; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra 
note 39, at 934–39. 
58 See Hayman, supra note 22, at 121; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 934–36, 
939. One advocate for persons with mental disabilities recognizes that the very fact that the 
law requires definitions of disability amplifies the discrimination of those with mental im-
pairments by affording and abridging rights based upon these categorizations. See Stefan, 
supra note 25, at xiii. Stefan laments that the law’s reliance on definitions has been unkind 
to those with mental disabilities because such terms construct mutually exclusive catego-
ries and the law demands that individuals fit into one category or the other: disabled-not 
disabled, competent-incompetent, mentally ill-not mentally ill. See id. Such rigidity is dia-
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A. Mental Disability Defined 
 Despite the many significant legal developments in the area of dis-
ability rights over the past century, the lack of stable definitions in the 
area of mental disability law is a significant impediment to the progress 
of the rights of person with disabilities.59 Although disagreement exists 
over the definition, the American Bar Association has suggested a few 
possibilities.60 First, mental disability is a catchall term which encom-
passes impairments of both mental and cognitive functioning.61 These 
disabilities are often reduced to several different categories including 
mental illness, developmental disabilities, communication disorders 
and substance abuse.62 These categorizations, however, cannot be heav-
ily relied upon because a particular impairment may not fit well within 
one or the other and, oftentimes, problems occur in tandem.63 Despite 
these differences, each type of mental disability is generally treated 
similarly in the context of law.64 
 Dementias are defined as organic mental disorders evidenced by a 
failure “to understand events and people, make plans, and take care of 
oneself.”65 Distinct from dementias, developmental disabilities are men-
tal, cognitive and physical impairments that begin in early adulthood 
and are likely to continue to impose functional impairments on the 
individual.66 The definition of one developmental disability, mental 
retardation, is hotly contested.67 For the purpose of this Note, mental 
retardation is defined as substantially subaverage intelligence coupled 
with limitations in two adaptive skill areas.68 
                                                                                                                      
metrically opposed to the very nature of psychiatric disability which is episodic and may be 
triggered or worsened by environmental or interpersonal factors. Id. 
59 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 934–36, 939; see also ADA Amendments Act 
of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 4, 122 Stat. 3553, 3555–56 (to be codified at 42 
U.S.C. §§ 12102–12103) (amending the definition of disability from that of the original 
ADA). 
60 See John Parry, Mental Disability Law: A Primer 2 (5th ed. 1995); Hurme & Ap-
pelbaum, supra note 39, at 934–36, 939. 




65 Id. at 4. Dementias caused by Alzheimer’s disease are believed to afflict one out of 
every twenty-five adults between the ages of sixty-five and seventy-four. Id. Alzheimer’s dis-
ease progressively erodes cognitive and functional abilities over time. Id. 
66 Parry, supra note 60, at 5. 
67 See Hayman, supra note 22, at 121. 
68 See Parry, supra note 60, at 5. Adaptive skill areas include communication, self care, 
home living, social skills, community use, self-direction, health and safety, functional aca-
demics, leisure, and work. Id. Anywhere from one to three percent of the population is 
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 Although these definitions can facilitate our discussion, they derive 
from the medical model of disability that focuses narrowly on assess-
ments of the degree of a person’s functional limitations.69 A more con-
temporary definition understands disability not merely as a physical or 
mental impairment but a result of discrimination in the social order 
based upon environmental factors and “narrow assumptions about 
what constitutes the normal range of human functioning.”70 
 The problem of mental disability has been scrutinized in the legal 
context when making determinations of competency and capacity ei-
ther in criminal or testamentary proceedings.71 Competency considera-
tions within the context of civil law can be traced to the origins of the 
laws of guardianship and wills in ancient Roman and English common 
law.72 At one point, the presence of a mental disability itself was suffi-
cient to deny an individual decision-making rights and privileges, but 
today lawmakers have begun to realize that competency is a nuanced 
concept, and thus some jurisdictions are increasingly requiring more 
thorough adjudication of competency before rights are revoked.73 
                                                                                                                      
classified as mentally retarded. Id. This definition accords with that accepted by the psychi-
atric community. See Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, Desk Reference to the Diagnostic Cri-
teria from DSM-IV-TR, at 52 (4th ed. 2000). 
69 See ADA Restoration Act of 2007: Hearing on H.R. 3195 Before the H. Comm. on Education 
and Labor, 110th Cong. 25, 28 (2008) [hereinafter ADA Restoration Act Hearing] (statement 
of Robert L. Burgdorf, Jr., Professor of Law, University of the District of Columbia); Mary 
Johnson, Before Its Time: Public Perception of Disability Rights, the Americans with Disabilities Act, 
and the Future of Access and Accomodation, 23 Wash U. J.L. & Pol’y 121, 138 (2007). 
70 See Richard K. Scotch, Models of Disability and the Americans with Disabilities Act, 21 
Berkeley J. Emp. & Lab. L. 213, 214–15 (2000); see also ADA Restoration Act Hearing, supra 
note 69, at 28. 
71 See Michael L. Perlin et al., Competence in the Law from Legal Theory to 
Clinical Application 5 (2008). 
72 See id. Guardianship is an involuntary procedure in which an individual is deemed 
incapable of making day-to-day decisions and is either put under the authority of another 
person or into a state run facility. See Black’s Law Dictionary 726 (8th ed. 2004). This 
guardian “assumes the power to make decisions about the ward’s person or property.” See 
id. 
73 See Parry, supra note 60, at 98; see, e.g., Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5) (Supp. 
2009) (“Imposition of a guardianship for an incapacitated person shall not result in the 
loss of the right to vote unless the court determines that the person is incompetent for 
purposes of rationally exercising the franchise . . . .”); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (2008) 
(“if the court finds that the individual is incapable of understanding the objective of the 
elective process”). 
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B. The Law of Elections: An Overview 
 The guarantee of a voice in government and the free exercise of 
legal rights are central features of democratic society.74 Accordingly, the 
design of electoral systems in modern democratic nations features two 
key objectives: “increasing enfranchisement and voting [as well as] as-
suring the integrity of the vote.”75 Some scholars have argued that “uni-
versal suffrage is essential if citizens are to recognize a government as 
legitimate.”76 They further reason that minority groups need the vote 
in order to protect themselves from powerful insiders who use govern-
ment power to subordinate them.77 Regardless, the various franchising 
amendments in the United States did not establish the broad principle 
of universal suffrage.78 Thus, in the United States, the right to vote is 
not per se constitutionally protected.79 Yet, implicit in our constitu-
tional system is a protected right to participate in state elections on an 
equal basis with other qualified voters.80 States have exercised broad 
discretion in the administration of elections but this discretion was 
bound by a constitutional prohibition of discrimination.81 Though the 
Supreme Court has found certain restrictions on the right to suffrage 
                                                                                                                      
74 See Rothstein & Rothstein, supra note 18, at 652. 
75 Jason H. Karlawish & Richard J. Bonnie, Voting by Elderly Persons with Cognitive Im-
pairment: Lessons from Other Democratic Nations, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 879, 880 (2007). 
76 Jane Rutherford, One Child, One Vote: Proxies for Parents, 82 Minn. L. Rev. 1463, 1486 
(1998). 
77 See id. at 1488. 
78 See id. While some may still argue for universal suffrage, the last of the voting rights 
amendments, the Twenty-Sixth Amendment did not incorporate this principle. U.S. 
Const. amend. XXVI, § 1. 
79 See San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 35 n.78 (1973) (recogniz-
ing a constitutional guarantee of equal participation for qualified voters in state elections 
but also holding absolute equality of education funding is not mandated). 
80 See id. 
81 See Lassiter v. Northampton County Bd. of Elections, 360 U.S. 45, 50 (1959). The 
Supreme Court has recognized that states have a legitimate interest in assuring “intelligent 
exercise of the franchise.” See Katzenbach v. Morgan, 384 U.S. 641, 654 (1966) (ruling 
English language voter literacy tests unconstitutional and discriminatory). The Court has 
also held that states may consider residence, age, and prior criminal record in determining 
voter eligibility. See Lassiter, 360 U.S. at 51. Lassiter upheld literacy tests on the basis that 
such tests were neutral on race, creed, color, and sex. See id. Where it was reasoned that 
literacy tests were designed to ensure “independent and intelligent” exercise of the right of 
suffrage, the Court found the requirement constitutionally permissible. See id. at 52–53. 
Under the Equal Protection Clause, however, more recent Supreme Court jurisprudence 
has given varying degrees of “close constitutional scrutiny” to voter eligibility requirements 
and eradicated many eligibility requirements that states once imposed. See Mo. Prot. & 
Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803, 808 (8th Cir. 2007); see, e.g., Carrington v. 
Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 94–95 (1965) (holding unconstitutional a restriction prohibiting active 
members of Armed Forces from voting in state). 
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withstand even heightened scrutiny, it has consistently required that 
any such restriction be justified by a compelling state interest.82 
 The Court has recognized “preserving the political community 
and preventing voter fraud” as compelling government goals warrant-
ing restrictions on the right to vote in some circumstances.83 Thus, as 
states have excluded persons with mental disabilities, they have sought 
to preserve the political community by distinguishing voters who intend 
to express some preference and affect the election results from those 
who do not understand the nature of voting, and whose votes could 
become subject to fraud.84 Nonetheless, in considering restrictions, the 
Supreme Court has been wary that “to the extent that a citizen’s right 
to vote is debased, he is that much less a citizen.”85 
C. State Law Restrictions on the Voting Rights of Persons  
with Mental Disabilities 
 Kristopher Willis, a twenty-six year old developmentally disabled 
man from Iowa and Adam Folsom, a twenty-eight year old suffering 
from velocardiofacial syndrome and some mental retardation both cast 
a ballot in the most recent presidential election.86 Parents of the men 
                                                                                                                      
82 See Richardson v. Ramirez, 418 U.S. 24, 54–55, 56 (1974) (rejecting a challenge to 
California laws denying ex-felons the right to vote); Dunn v. Blumstein, 405 U.S. 330, 344–
46 (1972). In rejecting a durational residency requirement as unconstitutional, the Court, 
in Dunn, suggested compelling state interests might include preventing electoral fraud and 
guaranteeing the existence of “knowledgeable voters” within the state. Dunn, 405 U.S. at 
345–60. The Court criticized a branch of the “knowledgeable voter” standard, which made 
“intelligent” voting a criterion, reasoning that this prong was “an elusive one and suscepti-
ble of abuse.” See id. at 356. The Court refused to decide “the extent to which a State 
[could] bar less knowledgeable or intelligent citizens from the franchise.” See id. 
83 See Karlan, supra note 16, at 925. 
84 See id. 
85 Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 567 (1964) (striking down inequality in state senate 
representation on the principle of “one person, one vote”). History itself is evidence that a 
lack of political power can both reflect and magnify societal subordination. See Rutherford, 
supra note 76, at 1478–85 (summarizing the struggles of African Americans and women in 
achieving equal rights). Nevertheless, under our current system “the outsiders must dem-
onstrate that they are sufficiently like the insiders who can vote” to obtain this right. See id. 
at 1488. To the extent that “outsiders,” such as persons with mental disabilities, are actually 
different from current voters, “they are caught in a bind” because current voters are 
unlikely to represent the interests of the mentally disabled. See id. 
86 Steve Gravelle, Mother Wants to Limit Voting for Disabled: Disabled People Entitled to Cast 
Ballots, Gazette (Cedar Rapids, Iowa), Nov. 18, 2008, at A1; Beth Velliquette, Mother to 
Challenge Vote Cast by Her Disabled Son, Herald-Sun (Durham, NC), Nov. 4, 2008, at C1. 
Velocardiofacial syndrome (VCFS) is a disorder characterized by a cleft palate (opening in 
the roof of the mouth), heart defects, characteristic facial appearance, minor learning 
problems and speech and feeding problems. See Nat’l Inst. on Deafness and Other Com-
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claimed that they were taken advantage of by their caregivers who facili-
tated their voting; therefore, they have sought redress under state law.87 
By contrast, in 2004, Floridian Kamal Samar was fighting for an oppor-
tunity for his twenty-three year old son, David, to cast a vote.88 Kamal 
argued, “He is a citizen of this country. He should be able to vote.”89 
Yet, based on state law, David’s legal guardianship likely posed a bar to 
his father’s efforts.90 
 Despite their different situations, Kristopher, Adam, and David 
each fell victim to state election laws that did not adequately protect 
their right to vote.91 David’s right was impeded by a legal system that 
failed to emphasize the importance of that right and follow a clear 
process to exclude only the truly mentally incapacitated from participat-
ing.92 Kristopher and Adam actually did vote but their ballot may have 
been fraudulently interfered with, and, like David, their right may be 
compromised in the future by a general lack of clarity in state election 
laws.93 
 A key challenge and the probable reason for the failure of universal 
suffrage efforts for the mentally disabled is the inability to agree upon a 
single definition of the capacity to vote.94 The hodgepodge of voting 
standards we see today was all but guaranteed when the Constitutional 
Convention compromised by adopting state standards for voting.95 Cur-
rently, forty-eight state constitutions exclude certain categories of people 
                                                                                                                      
munication Disorders, Statistics on Voice, Speech, and Language, http://www.nidcd.nih.gov/ 
health/statistics/vsl.asp (last visited Mar. 30, 2010). 
87 See Gravelle, supra note 86; Velliquette, supra note 86. 
88 Deborah Circelli, Poised for the Polls: Disabled Cherish Voting Rights, Say Advocates, Day-
tona News-J., Aug. 12, 2004, at C1. 
89 See id. 
90 See id. Although no follow-up article was published, Samar’s father had admitted that 
David would not likely understand the elections even if he were shown photos of the can-
didates, thus he argued for the opportunity to vote on his son’s behalf. See id. The out-
reach director from the Volusia County Supervisor of Elections spoke firmly against such 
proxy voting explaining that voter assistance is appropriate but that the disabled individual 
must understand and make the choice. See id. Further, the judge responsible for guardian-
ship determinations in the county indicated at the time the article was published that, if 
the disabled person lacked any understanding, he would consider denying the person the 
right to vote. See id. 
91 See Circelli, supra note 88; Gravelle, supra note 86; Velliquette, supra note 86. 
92 See Circelli, supra note 88; Gravelle, supra note 86; Velliquette, supra note 86. 
93 See Circelli, supra note 88; Gravelle, supra note 86; Velliquette, supra note 86. 
94 See Rutherford, supra note 76, at 1485. In 1963, Congress declined to pass a pro-
posed constitutional amendment that aimed “to establish a free and universal franchise 
throughout the United States.” H.R. J. Res. 3, 88th Cong., 109 Cong. Rec. 57 (1963); see 
H.R.J. Res. 231, 88th Cong., 109 Cong. Rec. 1672 (1963). 
95 See Rutherford, supra note 76, at 1486. 
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from eligibility to register and vote.96 Criminal convictions and mental 
status are persistent exclusions.97 
 A simplified way of grasping the far from consistent state 
exlcusions of the mentally disabled is to picture the voting right spread 
along a continuum measuring the extent of disenfranchisement.98 “At 
one end are the states that specifically encourage voting,” states that 
categorically bar voting at the other, and a mid-range that allow for a 
reservation of the right in some manner.99 
 Unclear exclusionary language led seven state constitutions deny 
the right to vote to “idiots or insane” persons.100 A number of states 
prohibit voting by those of unsound mind, non compos mentis, or 
those who are not of “quiet and peaceable behavior.”101 The constitu-
tions of sixteen states bar those adjudged mentally incompetent or in-
capacitated from voting.102 In addition, four states prohibit persons 
                                                                                                                      
96 Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 934. 
97 See id. at 934–35. 
98 Kyle Sammin & Sally Balch Hurme, Guardianship and Voting Rights, Bifocal, Fall 
2004, at 1, 11. 
99 See id. 
100 See, e.g., Ark. Const. art. III, § 5; Iowa Const. art. II, § 5; Ky. Const. § 145, cl. 3; 
Minn. Const. art. VII, § 1; Miss. Const. art. XII, § 241; N.M. Const. art. VII, § 1; Ohio 
Const. art. V, § 6; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 935. Idiocy has been under-
stood to refer to “mental feebleness due to disease or defect of brain, congenital or ac-
quired during development” resulting in lack of understanding. See In re S. Charleston 
Election Contest, 3 Ohio N.P. (n.s.) 373, 386 (Prob. Ct. 1905). The term insanity generally 
included idiocy and referred to “a person who has suffered such a deprivation of reason 
that he is no longer capable of understanding and acting with discretion and judgment in 
the ordinary affairs of life.” See Baker v. Keller, 237 N.E.2d 629, 638 (Ohio Ct. Com. Pl. 
1968). 
101 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 935. Two constitutions refuse suffrage to 
those of unsound mind. Ala. Const. art. V, § 2; Mont. Const. art. IV, § 2; see Hurme & 
Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 935. Those who are not of “quiet and peaceable behavior” 
are barred from the franchise in Vermont. Vt. Const. art. II, § 42; see Hurme & Appel-
baum, supra note 39, at 936. Yet, the Vermont Secretary of State has indicated informally 
that this is not used as a competence standard but rather “to facilitate peaceful conduct at 
town meetings.” See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 936 n. 27. Three states exclude 
persons of non compos mentis. See id. at 935. Non-compos mentis has been defined loosely 
as a complete lack of “mental capacity to understand the nature, consequences, and effect 
of a situation or transaction.” See Town of Lafayette v. City of Chippewa Falls, 235 N.W.2d 
435, 441 (Wis. 1975). The constitution of Kansas allows the legislature to deny those with 
“mental illness" the franchise. Kan. Const. art. V, § 2; see Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 
39, at 935. 
102 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 935. Likewise, Wisconsin allows for the 
disenfranchisement of those adjudged mentally incompetent. See Wis. Const. art. III, § 2; 
Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 29, at 935. Missouri and New Jersey exclude those ad-
judged incapacitated. Mo. Const. art. VIII, § 2; N.J. Const. art. II, § 1, ¶ 6; Hurme & Ap-
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“under guardianship” from the electorate.103 These provisions reveal 
not only that a wide array of individuals across the nation are denied 
suffrage by state constitutional provisions, but also that this denial is 
based on imprecise categorizations.104 Moreover, these constitutional 
provisions often fail to clearly define the categorizations used, thereby 
making them difficult to interpret and enforce.105 
 In addition to state constitutions, state election laws also address 
issues of cognitive impediments.106 To frustrate matters further, when 
elections laws coincide with a state constitutional provision, criteria for 
exclusion do not always coincide.107 Election laws of some states seem 
to overlook the fact that they even have a state constitutional provision 
barring persons by reason of a mental disability.108 Other states present 
a narrower basis for exclusion, while others still use entirely different 
language causing difficulty in determining who is subject to exclusion 
and on what basis.109 Twenty-eight states’ election laws do not comment 
                                                                                                                      
pelbaum, supra note 39, at 936. Missouri further excludes those involuntarily admitted to 
mental institutions. See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 935. 
103 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 943. This restriction has been held to 
refer strictly to the guardianship process of the state. See, e.g., Boyd v. Bd. of Registrars of 
Voters, 334 N.E.2d 629, 632 (Mass. 1975). However, one state reads the term broadly 
enough to include all residents of a state facility for the mentally disabled. See Lafayette, 235 
N.W.2d at 441–43. 
104 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 936. 
105 See id. at 940. 
106 See id. 
107 See id. In West Virginia, for example, the state constitution bars persons “declared 
mentally incompetent by a court of competent jurisdiction,” while the election law prohib-
its persons of “unsound mind.” See W. Va. Const. art. IV, § 1; W. Va. Code § 3–1–3 (2006). 
This inconsistency is not elucidated by the state’s guardianship law which uses neither 
categorization but instead refers to a ward as a “protected person.” See W. Va. Code § 44A-
1-4(13). 
108 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 939–40. Twenty states that have a consti-
tutional bar do not mention mental status within their election laws, perhaps because the 
constitution is deemed dispositive. See id. at 940. Yet, in Kansas and Wisconsin, the consti-
tution merely permitted the state legislatures to develop a standard for exclusion and the 
states failure to legislate must mean they have chosen not to exclude. Kan. Const. art. V, 
§ 2; Wis. Const. art. III, § 2; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 940. Nevertheless, the 
lack of consistency and clarity in the determination of voter eligibility can foster improper 
exclusions of individuals with mental disabilities based upon an ill-defined status rather 
than capacity. See, e.g., Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 38, 51, 56, 59 (D. Me. 2001) (dem-
onstrating that differences between a state constitutional provision and election law cre-
ated confusion resulting in denials which violated the constitution’s guarantees of equal 
protection and due process). 
109 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 937–39. 
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on exclusion due to mental disability at all; yet, twenty of those have 
some state constitutional bar.110 
 Significantly, the creation of a majority of these bars to voting co-
incided with the creation of asylums and institutions which removed 
whole classes of persons who were deemed disabled from communities 
across the country in the nineteenth century.111 Vermont and Maine 
led the way in disenfranchising voters because of intellectual and de-
velopmental disabilities.112 Vermont excluded those “not of peaceable 
behavior,” while Maine denied “persons under guardianship.”113 Only 
in 1831 did states adopt explicit methods of such disenfranchisement 
using the terms “idiot[s]” and “insane.”114 This shift in language dem-
onstrates an important development in public opinion.115 While em-
phasis was initially placed upon the fact that persons with disabilities 
were financially dependent or under guardianship, a growing focus on 
cognitive aptitude reflected a developing trend to exclude those with 
“intellectual and moral incompetency.”116 
II. Trend Toward Heightened Respect for the Individual 
Capacities of Persons with Mental Disabilities 
 Beginning as early as 1966, disability advocates began to argue for 
individuals with disabilities to have a right to live in an integrated 
                                                                                                                      
110 See id. at 940. Even more confusing is the law in Massachusetts. See id. at 956. Massa-
chusetts has both constitutional provisions and election law indicating that persons “under 
guardianship” cannot vote; however, the Secretary of State of Massachusetts issued an 
opinion that persons under guardianship should be able and encouraged to vote unless 
found incompetent to do so. See Opinion of the Elections Division, Persons Subject to 
Guardianships That Do Not Specifically Forbid Voting Are Eligible Voters, reprinted in 8 
John Cross et al., Guardianship and Conservatorship in Massachusetts 149 (2d ed. 
2000); Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 29, at 956. 
111 See Colker, supra note 23, at 1449. 
112 See id. 
113 Me. Const. art. II, § 1; Vt. Const. of 1793, ch. II, § 21; Colker, supra note 23, at 
1449. 
114 See Colker, supra note 23, at 1449. 
115 See id. at 1450. 
116 See id. Interestingly, women in the nineteenth century were similarly characterized. 
Rutherford, supra note 76, at 1481–82. They were labeled “morally inferior, emotional, 
irrational, delicate, passive, simple-minded, weak, timid, and child-like, and these stereo-
types reinforced the opposition to suffrage.” See id. “Even those who placed women on a 
pedestal did so to create a separate private sphere outside of politics: women were simply 
too sweet, naive, and sentimental to vote.” Id. at 1482. Later, “positive stereotypes enabled 
women to prevail.” See id. at 1483. 
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world.117 Since then, the law of disability discrimination developed un-
der this integrationist approach and enhanced the access of disabled 
individuals to education, housing, and even voting.118 
 This revolution in social policy has as its goal “making available to 
. . . people patterns of life and conditions of everyday living which are 
as close as possible to the regular circumstances and ways of society.”119 
In line with this trend, some states have begun to revise their laws to 
respect the autonomy of persons with mental disabilities.120 The federal 
government has also enacted legislation aimed at reducing discrimina-
tion and enforcing equal treatment, and new legal standards, informed 
by a contemporary understanding of mental disability have arisen.121 
These changes are facilitating a movement toward not just extending 
the right to vote to mentally disabled persons who are able but actually 
promoting its exercise.122 
A. State Law Changes Toward Recognition of the Individual Capacities of 
Mentally Disabled Persons 
 States have a compelling interest in ensuring that voters compre-
hend the voting process and make an independent choice when casting 
a vote but this interest does not change the fact that not all persons with 
                                                                                                                      
117 Ruth Colker, When Is Separate Unequal?: A Disability Perspective 24 
(2009); Jacobus tenBroek, The Right to Live in the World: The Disabled in the Law of Torts, 54 
Cal. L. Rev. 841, 917 (1966). 
118 See Colker, supra note 117, at 24–25. 
119 Martha A. Field & Valerie A. Sanchez, Equal Treatment for People with 
Mental Retardation 13 (1999). 
120 See Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1182–83. 
121 See, e.g., ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–325, 122 Stat. 
3553 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213); Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, 
Pub. L. No. 101–336, 104 Stat. 328 (1990) (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–
12213). 
122 See, e.g., N.J. Const. art. II, § 1(6); 42 U.S.C. §§ 12102–12103; Wash. Rev. Code 
§ 11.88.010(5) (Supp. 2009); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (2008); ADA Resotrative Act Hear-
ing, supra note 69, at 12 (citing the George W. Bush administration’s commitment to pro-
moting the rights of people with disabilities and their participation “in all aspects of 
American life”); Nat’l Council on Disability, Promises to Keep: A Decade of Federal 
Enforcement of the Americans with Disabilities Act 1 (2000) (noting an “increased 
recognition and understanding of the manner in which the physical and social environ-
ment can pose discriminatory barriers to people with disabilities” and describing the ADA 
as “a vehicle through with people with disabilities have made their political influence 
felt”). 
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a mental disability are incompetent to vote.123 States have already begun 
to narrow disenfranchisement based on an individual’s capacity.124 
 Most states acheived this end by creating forms of limited guardi-
anship and narrowly interpreting constitutional and election law provi-
sions to exclude only those under full guardianship.125 Traditionally, 
almost all guardianships were “broad and all inclusive”; this began to 
change in the 1960’s.126 In constrast, the modern emphasis “has been 
to establish more precise limits on the guardian’s powers and to make 
procedures stricter” for both creation and monitoring of the arrange-
ment.127 In 1980, the American Bar Association endorsed a resolution 
which urged states to help persons with mental disabilities live self-
sufficiently to the maximum extent practicable by developing limited 
or partial guardianships.128 Although at the time of this endorsement 
few states recognized limited guardianships, today at least forty-two 
states do.129 State probate laws have essentially attempted to grapple 
with the reality that “when people start sliding downhill they often slide 
slowly, almost imperceptibly. They have good days and bad days. They 
can manage some things and not others.”130 Accordingly, in excluding 
the mentally incapacitated, several states have come to reflect upon 
                                                                                                                      
123 Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1181–82. 
124 See id. 
125 See id. at 1182–83. 
126 See John W. Parry & Sally Balch Hurme, Guardianship Monitoring and Enforcement Na-
tionwide, 15 Mental & Physical Disability L. Rep. 304, 304 (1991). Gradually, states 
have come to appreciate the far-reaching consequences of guardianship which restricts the 
liberty and forecloses certain legal and civil rights of a ward. See id.; Phillip B. Tor & Bruce 
D. Sales, Research on the Law and Practice of Guardianship, in Mental Health and Law: 
Research Policy and Services 75, 75–79 (Bruce D. Sales & Salim A. Shah eds., 1996). 
Guardianship is rooted in the feudal English doctrine of parens patriae by which the Eng-
lish crown would assume the role of parent for those who lacked discretion to manage 
their own affairs. See Tor & Sales, supra, at 75–79. In the United States, guardianship is 
similarly a means by which the state assumes custody of a child or mentally or physically 
disabled person who is unable to protect his or her self. Id. 
127 See Tor & Sales, supra note 126, at 75–79. Initially, a guardianship hearing could 
consist of little more than a doctor’s letter of medical diagnosis; today, however, demands 
of substantive due process, the availability of less restrictive alternatives and a general ten-
dency to grant power no greater than necessary to protect the ward result in a more rigor-
ous process. See id. 
128 See id. 
129 See id. 
130 See Lawrence M. Friedman & June O. Starr, Losing It in California: Conservatorship 
and the Social Organization of Aging, 73 Wash.U. L.Q. 1501, 1524 (1995). This trend sharply 
contrasts the “sharp, brittle, black-and-white distinctions between competence and incom-
petence” imposed by older legal doctrine. See id. at 1523. 
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whether the probate judge found the person incompetent for the spe-
cific purpose of voting.131 
 Another route to change has been to remove over-inclusive terms 
from state laws.132 New Jersey’s 2007 elimination by referendum of the 
phrase “idiot or insane person” is an example of this trend.133 Similarly, 
some states have eliminated old terminology which promoted impre-
cise categorization and was plainly offensive but did not replace these 
terms with a clear standard.134 Such uncertainty as to who a standard 
excludes provides fertile ground for violations of constitutional guaran-
tees of equal protection due to categorical rather than necessary and 
proper exclusion.135 
                                                                                                                      
131 Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1183. 
132 See id. 
133 See N.J. Const. art. II, § 1(6); Election Results 2007, Ballotwatch (Initiative & Ref-
erendum Inst., Univ. of S. Cal., L.A., Cal.), Nov. 13, 2007, at 2. The new provision excludes 
only a “person who has been adjudicated by a court of competent jurisdiction to lack ca-
pacity to understand the act of voting.” N.J. Const. art. II, § 1(6). New Jersey state senate 
president Richard Codey proposed the bill noting that the archaic language of the state’s 
standard was not only “insensitive, but it [did] not take into account the individual circum-
stances of people with varying degrees of disabilities.” See Susan K. Livio, Pushing to Scrap a 
Lawful Indignity, Star-Ledger (Newark, N.J.), Jan. 8, 2007, at 13. While a majority of voters 
agreed with Codey and the referendum passed, some criticized the change implying allow-
ing persons with mental disabilities to vote would allow “crooked people to grab power by 
rigging elections.” See Seth Grossman, Op-Ed, It’s Not About Stigmas, It’s About Politics, N.J. 
Rec. (Bergen County, N.J.), Oct. 25, 2007, at L9. 
134 See, e.g., 2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 776–79; 73 Del. Laws 321 (2001) (amending Del. 
Const. art. V, § 2). In amending its guardianship law provision the Washington legislature 
found: 
[T]he right to vote is a fundamental liberty and that this liberty should not be 
confiscated without due process. When the state chooses to use guardianship 
proceedings as the basis for the denial of a fundamental liberty, an individual 
is entitled to basic procedural protections that will ensure fundamental fair-
ness. These basic procedural protections should include clear notice and a 
meaningful opportunity to be heard. The legislature further finds that the 
state has a compelling interest in ensuring that those who cast a ballot under-
stand the nature and effect of voting is an individual decision, and that any 
restriction of voting rights imposed through guardianship proceedings 
should be narrowly tailored to meet this compelling interest. 
2005 Wash. Sess. Laws 776. 
135 See Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Servs., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808–09 (8th Cir. 
2007) (reasoning categorical prohibition of a ward from voting would not withstand close 
equal protection scrutiny); see also Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d. at 56 (D. Me. 2001) (find-
ing inconsistent and unclear terminology in a state constitution and election law resulted 
in unconstitutional exclusion from the electorate of otherwise capable persons with men-
tal disabilities). 
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B. The Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990, the ADA Amendments  
Act of 2008, and Court Precedent 
 Only with the passage of the ADA, did the disabled minority gain 
the kind of legislative ground for civil rights that women and blacks 
achieved during the civil rights era of the 1960s.136 In enacting the 
ADA, Congress intended to provide a comprehensive national mandate 
for the “elimination of discrimination against individuals with disabili-
ties.”137 Congress found that “mental disabilities in no way diminish a 
person’s right to fully participate in all aspects of society,” though such 
participation is often inhibited as a result of “prejudice, antiquated atti-
tudes, or failure to remove societal and institutional barriers” that exist 
against the mentally disabled.138 Yet, the ADA’s ambitious objective was 
thwarted when the Supreme Court narrowly construed its definition of 
disability, thereby denying protection to individuals Congress intended 
to protect.139 The Court’s precedent has led lower courts to follow suit 
                                                                                                                      
136 See Silvers & Francis, supra note 48, at 33. 
137 ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2(a)(1), 122 Stat. 
3553, 3553 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101). 
138 See id. § 2(a)(2). 
139 See id.; Sutton v. United Air Lines, Inc., 527 U.S. 471, 486–87 (1999). In Sutton v. 
United Air Lines, Inc., the Court rejected the claims of two women who were denied em-
ployment as pilots for an airline because their uncorrected vision did not meet the acuity 
requirement. See 527 U.S. at 475–76. The Court reasoned that Congress could not have 
intended “disabled” to apply to cover individuals when their limitations could be reduced 
by mitigating measures. See id. at 486–87. In this way, a court could deny a person with 
severe disabling depression protection under the Act if it can be shown that a treatment 
regimen would reduce the limitations on his functioning. See Murphy v. United Parcel 
Serv., Inc., 527 U.S. 516, 521 (1999) (focusing narrowly on whether the petitioner was 
disabled and reasoning “whether petitioner is ‘disabled’ due to limitations that persist 
despite his medication or the negative side effects of his medication”). The scope of pro-
tection intended by the bill has been even further curtailed by the Court in subsequent 
decisions; for example, in Toyota Motor Manufacturing, Kentucky, Inc. v. Williams, the Court 
reversed the circuit court’s finding that the plaintiff was disabled and required on remand 
that the court determine whether the plaintiff’s disability “prevents or severely restricts the 
individual from doing activities that are of central importance to most people’s daily lives.” 
See 534 U.S. 184, 198 (2002). Yet, the ADA itself does not contain this “severely restricts” 
requirement, but rather a lesser “substantial limitation” standard. See 42 U.S.C. 
§ 12101(2)(a); Ruth Colker, The Mythic 43 Million Americans with Disabilities, 49 Wm & Mary 
L. Rev. 1, 61 (2007). Moreover, the Court refused to apply Title I against the states for 
money damages because Congress had not relied on evidence sufficient to provide a ra-
tional basis for concluding that states were engaged in patterns of employment discrimina-
tion against disabled persons that required such prophylactic legislation. See Bd. of Trs. v. 
Garrett, 531 U.S. 356, 374 (2001). Although in recently finding that Congress’s prophylac-
tic legislation was supported by sufficient evidence, the Court upheld Title II against the 
states; it did so narrowly, however, with regard to the right of access to courts. See Tennes-
see v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 524–25, 527–28 (2004). 
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and ignore the more comprehensive congressional intent and under-
standing of disability discrimination that was codified in the ADA.140 
 In light of this history, Congress recently passed the ADA Amend-
ments Act of 2008, to provide “clear, enforceable standards addressing 
discrimination.”141 The ADAAA specifically rejects a narrow definition 
of disability and therefore affords protection to a broad scope of per-
sons.142 The definition adopted consists of three prongs: “a physical or 
mental impairment that substantially limits one or more of the major 
life activities of such individuals; a record of having such an impair-
ment; or being regarded as having such an impairment.”143 Congress 
carefully elucidated major life activities listing among them, “caring for 
oneself, performing normal tasks, seeing, hearing, eating, sleeping, 
walking, standing, lifting, bending, speaking, breathing, learning, read-
ing, concentrating, thinking, communicating, and working,” but also 
qualified this list as non-exclusive.144 Additionally, the third prong of 
the definition provides protection where an individual has been sub-
jected to a prohibited action “because of an actual or perceived physical 
or mental impairment whether or not the impairment limits or is per-
ceived to limit a substantial life activity.”145 Notably, this definition en-
courages courts to broadly construe the scope of its protections.146 
 Congress also provided courts with specific rules of construc-
tion.147 The first of these rules colors the rest, mandating that the Act’s 
definition of disability be construed in favor of broad coverage of indi-
viduals to the maximum extent permitted by its terms.148 The other 
rules clarify the terms of the Act to broaden the disabled class, with the 
last providing that determination of whether a person is disabled 
should “be made without regard to the ameliorative effects of mitigat-
ing measures.”149 Consequently, the ADAAA has reaffirmed the con-
gressional intent behind the ADA and re-established the scope of its 
protection to ensure that persons with disabilities are treated equally.150 
                                                                                                                      
140 See generally ADA Amendments Act of 2008 (ADAAA), Pub. L. No. 110–325, § 2, 122 
Stat. 3553, 3553–3554 (to be codified at 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101–12213); Toyota, 534 U.S. at 198. 
141 See ADAAA § 2(b)(1). 
142 See id. 
143 42 U.S.C. § 12102 (1). 
144 See ADAAA § 4(a)(2)(A). 
145 See id. § 4 (a)(3)(A). 
146 See id. § 4(a)(4)(A). 
147 See id. § 4. 
148 See id. § 4(a)(4)(A). 
149 See ADAAA § 4(a)(4). This last rule specifically reverses the result in Sutton. See id. 
§ 4(a)(4)(E); Sutton, 527 U.S. at 486–87. 
150 See ADAAA §§ 2–4. 
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If successful, the focus will shift away from an individual’s inherent dif-
ferences and onto the practices of society “examined in light of latent 
flexibility in structuring and modifying tasks, programs, facilities, and 
opportunities.”151 
 Title II of the ADA, provides that “no qualified individual with a 
disability shall, by reason of such disability, be excluded from participa-
tion in or be denied the benefits of the services, programs or activities 
of a public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such en-
tity.”152 Although the Eleventh Amendment has posed a bar to private 
suits seeking money damages due to state violations under Title I of the 
ADA , the Supreme Court held that in at least one circumstance, Title 
II permits private suits for money damages.153 Title II states that voting 
falls within the rights protected from discrimination by the ADA as a 
service, program or activity provided by a public entity such as any state 
or local government.154 Further, discriminatory denial of voting rights 
should likewise give rise to a right to sue privately for money damages 
under Title II.155 
C. Contemporary Understanding of Mental Disability with Regard to  
Voting Capacity: An Incentive to Develop Less Restrictive  
Voter Eligibility Requirements 
 Even in the face of a strong presumption that persons are compe-
tent to vote, contemporary disability advocates recognize that, at times, 
it may be necessary to directly assess that capacity.156 As discussed ear-
lier, such a standard was not necessary in the past because incapacity 
was often defined solely by status, that is, for example, persons under 
guardianship, institutionalized or insane.157 
 Fortunately some jurisdictions, influenced by contemporary un-
derstandings of mental disability, are adopting more individualized 
functional assessments rather than categorical definitions of capacity.158 
                                                                                                                      
151 ADA Restorative Act Hearing, supra note 69, at 26. 
152 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006). 
153 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 531; Garrett, 531 U.S. at 374. Lane held “that Title II unques-
tionably is valid § 5 legislation as it applies to the class of cases implicating the accessibility 
of judicial services.” Lane, 541 U.S. at 531. 
154 See 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12132. 
155 See id. § 12132; Lane, 541 U.S. at 530–31. 
156 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 960. 
157 See id. 
158 See id. at 936–45, 961. 
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Four states have attempted to define a standard.159 Washington, for ex-
ample, excludes from voting only those persons who “lack[] capacity to 
understand the nature and effect of voting such that he or she cannot 
make an individual choice.”160 Wisconsin provides that incapacity for 
purposes of voting is established when a person is found “incapable of 
understanding the objective of the elective process.”161 Both the Wash-
ington and Wisconsin standards share a basic requirement that the per-
son have some understanding of the electoral process.162 Even as early 
as 1907, courts searching for a standard of voting capacity recognized 
knowledge of the nature and effect of one’s act in casting a vote as the 
generally accepted rule.163 
 Although scientific knowledge can assist in the formulation of a 
standard for voting capacity, the end result will always be a policy meas-
ure, not scientific itself.164 The capacities of persons with mental dis-
abilities range from greater to lesser proficiency with no scientifically 
determinant point at which a mark of sufficient capacity can be estab-
lished.165 Accordingly, where the mark is placed must be derived from 
balancing the importance of allowing the person to exercise the right 
with the potential adverse outcomes of such an allowance.166 
 At law, capacities generally fall within two categories, decisional 
(capacity to decide something) and performance-oriented (capacity to 
do something).167 Voting is essentially a decisional capacity, it rests on 
the cognitive function of grasping data and choosing between op-
                                                                                                                      
159 See Del. Code. Ann. tit. 15, § 1701 (2007); Iowa Code § 633.556 (2003 & Supp. 
2009); Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5) (Supp. 2009); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (2008). 
160 Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5). Similarly, Delaware excludes those with “severe 
cognitive impairment which precludes exercise of basic voting judgment.” Del. Code. 
Ann. tit. 15, § 1701. Iowa denies any person that “lacks sufficient mental capacity to com-
prehend and exercise the right to vote” Iowa Code § 633.556. 
161 Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g. 
162 See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g. 
163 See Welch v. Shumway, 83 N.E. 549, 558 (Ill. 1907). The Federal District Court for 
the District of Maine recently reaffirmed this general rule and all but adopted the Wash-
ington standard. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5); Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Hurme & 
Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 962. 
164 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 962. 
165 See id. 
166 See id. Adverse outcomes would include the harms suffered by a state and the dis-
abled person when a person who does not understand the nature and effect of voting casts 
a vote or someone else takes advantage of a person’s disability to cast a fraudulent vote. See 
Jason H. Karlawish et al., Addressing the Ethical, Legal, and Social Issues Raised by Voting by 
Persons with Dementia, 292 J. Am. Med. Ass’n 1345, 1345 (2004). 
167 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 962. 
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tions.168 Decisional capacity analysis is not new to the law, so states can 
rely upon its well-developed foundations in creating a standard.169 Over 
time consideration of decisional capacity has come to rely upon four 
main elements: a person’s ability to (1) understand relevant informa-
tion, (2) appreciate the effects of one’s own decisions, (3) compare op-
tions and (4) make choices.170 Thus, legislatures can craft capacity stan-
dards out of all or some of these elements and the degree to which any 
one element is emphasized will tailor the rigor of the test.171 
 The states that have offered guidance to elections administrators 
have adopted a low standard for voting capacity in order to maximize 
the number of people eligible to vote.172 Their decision likely relies 
upon the strong weighing of policy in favor of extending the right to 
vote, “a defining characteristic of democratic polity,” against the small 
and uncertain risk for abuse, fraud, or otherwise improper ballot cast-
ing by the marginally incapacitated.173 
 Furthermore, the creation of a standard is aided by the substantial 
development of standardized assessments of decisional capacity over 
the last few years.174 These new tools produce quantitative measures 
that can be considered when assessing capacity but are not given de-
terminate weight.175 Knowing the typical range associated with capacity 
and incapacity based upon statistical data can aid a professional in 
tough cases, but any score that falls below an established cut-off would 
                                                                                                                      
168 See id. at 962–63. Even though voting requires some physical act like flipping a lever 
or filling in a bubble on the ballot, that action is not intrinsic to the act of voting itself and 
no longer needs to be completed by the person himself. See id. 
169 See id. Examples of recognized decisional capacities include the ability to contract, 
marry, create a will and make decisions regarding one’s medical treatment. See id. 
170 See Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 43, at 1033. When more elements are included in 
the standard, the more rigorous the test of capacity becomes. See id. at 1034–35, 1036–37. 
171 See id. A difficult test would require the person to understand the act of voting, be 
able to reason between candidates and ballot measures and appreciate his own choice and 
the effect of his casting a ballot, thereby incorporating all four legal standards of deci-
sional capacity. See id. at 1034–35, 1036–37. 
172 See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5) (Supp. 2009); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g 
(2008). 
173 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 963–64. This inference and the modern 
trend toward extending the right to vote are reinforced by the fact that only the under-
standing element of the decisional capacity test has been adopted even though medical 
evidence has shown that each additional element added to such a test will narrow the class 
considered capable. Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 43, at 1035–36. Further, in retaining 
this element, legislatures and courts require only a “modicum of knowledge” of voting and 
forbid any more particularized inquiry. See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 965. 
174See Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 43, at 1033–34; Hurme & Appelbaum, supra 
note 39, at 966. 
175See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 963–64, 966. 
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simply indicate the need for more careful evaluation, not a categorical 
exclusion.176 
 The Competence Assessment Tool for Voting (CAT-V) is one such 
test that poses certain tasks to the subject in order to probe his or her 
understanding of the nature and effect of voting and ability to choose 
between options.177 The CAT-V was tested on a small group of Alz-
heimer’s patients at the Memory Disorders Clinic at the University of 
Pennsylvania and revealed tight correlation between scores and the de-
gree of dementia.178 Nevertheless, these results remain to be demon-
strated on a wide scale.179 Regardless, the advantage of such a tool is 
that it “focuses the interviewer’s attention on the specific abilities requi-
site to voting and may even provide a basis for educating the person 
being evaluated so that they might[sic] acquire sufficient understand-
ing to achieve capacity.”180 
 Contemporary understanding of mental disability has evolved sub-
stantially and now encourages and assists the expansion of the right to 
vote.181 Some states have already begun to establish standards to assess a 
person’s capacity to vote.182 Additionally, structured assessment instru-
ments have substantially developed to such an extent that they can as-
sist in providing a spectrum upon which states can mark at what point 
                                                                                                                      
176 See Appelbaum et al., supra note 43, at 2094–95, 2097. 
177 See id. at 2095. The exam itself features an assessor asking various questions, such as 
“Imagine that two candidates are running for Governor of [subject’s state], and today is 
Election Day in [subject’s state],” “What will the people of [subject’s state] do today to pick 
the next Governor?” (testing the subject’ understanding of the nature of voting), and 
“When the election for governor is over, how will it be decided who the winner is?” (testing 
the subject’s understanding of the effect of voting). Id. at 2099. The second part of the test 
concerns the subject’s ability to choose between candidates posing a choice between two 
hypothetical candidates with different platforms. See id. 
178 See id. at 2095, 2096 tbl.1. This element of the test makes the test arguably more 
rigorous than what would be required by the standard states and courts have been inclined 
to adopt as mentioned above. See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5) (Supp. 2009); Wis. 
Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g (2008); Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Welch, 83 N.E at 558; Appelbaum 
et al., supra note 43, at 2095, 2096 tbl.1. Regardless, the actual test data seemed to indi-
cated that this “choice” element of the decisional test was more frequently met than the 
“understanding” element by the group tested. See Appelbaum et al., supra note 45, at 2095, 
2096 tbl.1. 
179 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 970. 
180 See id. 
181 See Karlawish et al., supra note 166, at 1346; Charles P. Sabatino & Edward D. Spurgeon, 
Facilitating Voting as People Age: The Implications of Cognitive Impairments, 38 McGeorge L. Rev. 
843, 850–52 (2007). 
182 See Wash. Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g. 
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mental incapacity is sufficient to deny persons the right.183 Thus, in ac-
cordance with this trend, all states should create measurable standards 
for voting capacity based upon the low threshold of a person’s ability to 
understand the nature and effect of voting.184 
III. Reform Among States Lags Behind Despite Recent  
Court Decisions 
 Despite advances in understanding mental disability and the crea-
tion of tests that provide reliable measurements of mental capacity, 
some states have not changed their constitutions or election laws to 
remedy this unjustified disenfranchisement.185 Without modification, 
these laws allow for summary denial of the right of suffrage to persons 
with mental disabilities, who nevertheless understand the nature and 
effect of voting and have the ability to make choices, in violation of the 
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.186 Even worse, 
informal barriers that prevent access to the polls or absentee voting may 
persist despite the most inclusive state constitutions and election laws.187 
A. Tennessee v. Lane: Affirming Title II Protection for  
Certain Fundamental Rights 
 Tennessee v. Lane, a recent case under Title II, was brought by plain-
tiffs who were paraplegics who used wheelchairs for mobility claiming 
“they were denied access to, and the services of, the state court system by 
reason of their disabilities.”188 Although the plaintiffs did not contest 
their voting eligibility, the Supreme Court referred to voting at least five 
times in its opinion.189 Particularly, the Court recognized the harm 
Congress sought to redress by enacting Title II—the “pervasive unequal 
treatment in the administration of state services and programs, includ-
ing systematic deprivations of fundamental rights.”190 Moreover, the 
Court noted that “[a]s of 1979, most States still categorically disqualified 
                                                                                                                      
183 See Appelbaum et al., supra note 43, at 2099; Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 43, at 
1034. 
184 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56; Karlawish et al., supra note 166, at 1346; see also Wash. 
Rev. Code § 11.88.010(5); Wis. Stat. § 54.25(2)(c)1.g; Welch, 83 N.E. at 558; Appelbaum 
et al., supra note 43, at 2099; Grisso & Appelbaum, supra note 43, at 1033. 
185 Developments in the Law, supra note 38, at 1184–85. 
186 See U.S. Const. amend XIV; Doe v. Rowe, 156 F. Supp. 2d 35, 56 (D. Me. 2001). 
187 See Colker, supra note 23, at 1451. 
188 See 42 U.S.C. § 12132 (2006); Tennessee v. Lane, 541 U.S. 509, 513 (2004). 
189 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 513, 524, 529. 
190 See id. at 524. 
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‘idiots’ from voting, without regard to individual capacity.”191 The opin-
ion seemed to lament that many of these laws “remain on the books” 
and recognized that one such law was recently challenged in 2001.192 
 Notably, Lane found that Title II sought to enforce not only a pro-
hibition on disability discrimination but also “a variety of other basic 
constitutional guarantees.”193 The Court emphasized that such rights 
were “subject to more searching judicial review” and some were “pro-
tected by the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”194 
Under this review, the Court found Title II to be congruent and pro-
portional to its object of enforcing the right of access to the courts, a 
fundamental right.195 The Lane opinion recognized that the ADA de-
manded states remove such barriers because failure to do so would 
have the same practical effect of outright exclusion.196 
 Therefore, Title II could prove to be a tool to enforce other fun-
damental rights that have been subject to a similar history of discrimi-
nation, like the right to vote.197 At the very least, Lane is strong prece-
dent that allegations of discriminatory denial of the right to vote will be 
evaluated at a closer level of scrutiny than rational basis.198 At best, Lane 
supports the proposition that “ordinary considerations of cost and con-
venience alone” will not justify a state’s denial of a fundamental liberty 
interest such as the right to vote and, on the other hand, may oblige 
the state to provide for that right’s meaningful exercise.199 
B. Doe v. Rowe: Holding States Accountable for Discriminatory Voting Laws 
 Lane referred to a 2001 voting rights case that was a significant vic-
tory for persons with mental disabilities in the state of Maine.200 In Doe 
v. Rowe, the U.S. District Court of Maine considered whether Maine’s 
                                                                                                                      
191 See id. (quoting Cleburne v. Cleburne Living Ctr., Inc., 473 U.S. 432, 464 (1985) 
(Marshall, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part) (stating that a requirement of a 
special use permit for a group home for the mentally retarded violated the Equal Protec-
tion Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment)). 
192 See id. 
193 See id. 
194 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 522–23. 
195 See id. at 533–34. The Court justified its conclusion saying, “[T]he unequal treat-
ment of disabled persons in the administration of judicial services has a long history, and 
has persisted despite several legislative efforts to remedy the problem of disability dis-
crimination.” See id. at 531. 
196 See id. 
197 See id. at 530–32. 
198 See id. at 522–23. 
199 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 533–32. 
200 Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 38, 51, 56, 59. 
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constitution and its state election law violated the Due Process and 
Equal Protection Clauses, the ADA and the Rehabilitation in prohibit-
ing “persons under guardianship for reasons of mental illness” from 
registering to vote and voting in any election.201 The case included 
three individual plaintiffs and the Disability Rights Center of Maine, 
Inc., which represented each plaintiff as well as the rights of all Maine 
residents who had been denied the right to vote as a result of being 
placed under guardianship for mental illness.202 
 The first plaintiff was Jane Doe, a thirty year old placed under full 
guardianship as a result of bipolar disorder.203 At her guardianship pro-
ceedings, the probate court did not consider her capacity to vote or no-
tify her that she would lose the right to vote as a result of the place-
ment.204 Just before the November 2000 election, Jane desired to vote, 
but the constitution of Maine prohibited her from engaging in that ac-
tivity.205 She sought a preliminary injunction to allow her to vote and, in 
so doing, learned that the State of Maine’s position was “that a person 
under full guardianship by reason of mental illness could vote if the 
Probate Court specifically reserved this individual’s right to vote.”206 Ac-
cordingly, Jane Doe filed a petition with the Aroostook County Probate 
Court to modify her guardianship order and was granted the motion.207 
 The next plaintiff, Jill Doe, was a seventy-five year old woman also 
diagnosed with bipolar disorder and placed under guardianship upon 
being classified as incapacitated by reason of her mental illness.208 Jill 
averred that no one raised the issue of her capacity to vote at her 
guardianship proceeding.209 Like Jane, Jill filed a motion with the Pe-
                                                                                                                      
201 See id. The court found that “pursuant to Maine’s Constitution and the relevant im-
plementing statute, persons who are ‘under guardianship for reasons of mental illness’ are 
prohibited from registering to vote or voting in any election.” Id. at 38. Further, the state 
criminalized the act of voting if the person had knowledge he or she was prohibited. See 
Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 21–A, § 674(3)(B) (2009). 
202 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 
203 See id. The court adopted the Department of Health and Human Services under-
standing of bipolar disorder as “a recurrent mood disorder featuring one or more epi-
sodes of mania or mixed episodes of mania and depression.” Id. at 39 n.4; U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Servs., Mental Health: A Report of the Surgeon General 246 
(1999). 
204 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 39. 
205 See id. 
206 See id. 
207 See id. 
208 See id. 
209 Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 40. Jill contested that she was incapacitated at the guardian-
ship proceeding and in the alternative argued that she should be placed under limited 
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nobscot County Probate Court asking her order be revised so she could 
vote in the November 2000 election.210 In support of her motion, Jill 
offered an affidavit from her psychiatrist, indicating that the doctor be-
lieved Jill “understood the nature and effect of voting such that she 
could make an individual choice about the candidates and questions 
on the ballot.”211 Although her motion was unopposed, the probate 
judge denied it summarily based on his reading of the law, specifically 
“under the provisions of Article II, Section I of the Constitution of the 
State of Maine.”212 
  The third plaintiff, June Doe, was under guardianship as a result 
of being diagnosed with mild organic brain syndrome, intermittent ex-
plosive disorder, and antisocial personality.213 Just like Jane and Jill, 
June’s capacity to vote was not considered at her guardianship proceed-
ing.214 June wanted to vote but could not file a motion because she was 
hospitalized; her motion, however, would have been heard by the same 
probate judge who summarily dismissed Jill’s motion and would likely 
have faced a comparable fate.215 Her doctor testified that “based on his 
. . . 32 years of experience [he] generally believe[d] that a person un-
der guardianship for severe mental illness ‘is more likely to be moni-
tored and receive treatment which will help restore him or her to ca-
pacity in areas such as voting’ compared to [other mentally ill persons] 
not under guardianship.”216 The Doe court related this doctor’s obser-
vation to what the U.S. Supreme Court had described as a “common 
phenomenon” among mental disorders, that the patient functions well 
with medication but because of the illness, lacks the capacity to follow 
the treatment regime.217 This logic, if accepted, may undercut the rea-
soning behind any limitation on the voting rights for persons under 
                                                                                                                      
guardianship only to ensure she take her medication. See id. at 39–40. The probate judge 
nonetheless placed her under a full guardianship arrangement. See id. 
210 See id. at 40. In support of her motion, Jill gave a sworn affidavit attesting that she 
had voted in the past by absentee ballot being unaware that she was not allowed. See id. 
211 See id. 
212 Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 40; see Me. Const. art. II, § 1. 
213 Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 40. Antisocial personality disorder is a “pattern of disregard 
for and violation of the rights of others.” Am. Psychiatric Ass’n, supra note 75, at 685. 
Organic brain syndrome describes “any of various disorders of cognition caused by per-
manent or temporary brain dysfunction and characterized especially by dementia.” Am. 
Heritage Dictionary 1239 (4th ed. 2000). 
214 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 40. 
215 See id. at 41. 
216 See id. at 41 n.7. 
217 See id. (citing Olmstead v. L.C., 527 U.S. 581, 610 (Kennedy, J., concurring)). 
388 Boston College Third World Law Journal [Vol. 30:359 
guardianship for reasons of mental illness and likely supports the con-
verse.218 
 The State of Maine argued that it was a duty of probate court 
judges to determine a person’s capacity at the guardianship hearing.219 
Yet, the record itself evidenced confusion among the probate judges as 
to whether they were bound by such a duty, let alone whether they had 
the authority to make such a determination in the first place.220 More-
over, the court observed that individuals with mental illness subjected 
to guardianship proceedings were not specifically advised that “they 
could be disenfranchised if they are placed under full guardianship.”221 
 In addition, neither the Maine Constitution nor the relevant stat-
ute set forth a definition of “mental illness.”222 In 1980, the Deputy Sec-
retary of State advised that the restriction only applied to “a person un-
der guardianship for reasons of mental illness.”223 He also stated that it 
did not include those mentally ill but not under guardianship or those 
who appeared “senile” or “retarded” or who had another physical or 
mental handicap.224 During the Doe litigation, the defendants realized 
that this view disenfranchised an “arbitrarily defined group of citi-
zens.”225 Consequently, they argued that the court should read the term 
broadly to include all persons under full guardianship.226 
 The Doe court considered Maine’s drastic re-interpretations of the 
definition of mental illness and the proffered due process protections 
as a desperate attempt to cover up constitutional infirmities in the 
state’s law.227 Accordingly, the court found that the manner by which 
Maine disenfranchised persons with mental illness violated guarantees 
of due process and equal protection, both facially and as applied, as 
well as Title II of the ADA.228 Significantly, the opinion derided the 
state’s definition of mental illness saying that it “singles out, for no le-
                                                                                                                      
218 See id. 
219 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 43. 
220 See id. 
221 See id. 
222 See id. 
223 See id at 44. 
224 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 44. The Office of the Maine Secretary of State again 
adopted a similar position in 1999. See id. 
225 See id. 
226 See id. The court was skeptical of this position because there was no evidence of at-
tempts to advise or educate municipal officials and there was no indication that voters had 
been advised of this new broad meaning of “mental illness” when they re-affirmed the 
restriction by referendum in November 2000. See id. at 44–45. 
227 See id. at 45–46. 
228 Id. at 49, 50–51, 52, 56, 59. 
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gitimate basis, people with psychiatrically based diagnos[e]s as opposed 
to all those who may be under guardianship for reasons of mental in-
capacity.”229 Most importantly, the court warned that adding more di-
agnoses to the category of mental illness increases the risk that people 
who understand the nature and effect of voting will be wrongfully de-
nied their right.230 In sum, Doe established that a categorical exclusion 
of persons with mental disabilities that did not distinguish between per-
sons who understood the nature and effect of voting and those who did 
not was unconstitutional and in violation of federal law.231 Moreover, 
the court found that the manner by which this exclusion was effectu-
ated particularly offended the procedural due process guarantees.232 
C. Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services, Inc. v. Carnahan:  
A Bump on the Road 
 In Missouri Protection & Advocacy Services, Inc. v. Carnahan, residents 
and an advocacy organization challenged a Missouri constitutional pro-
vision and its implementing statute, which denied the right to vote to 
residents under guardianship by reason of mental incapacity.233 The 
court recognized that Missouri’s prohibition had “a long history.”234 
Like other states, Missouri originally barred from voting persons kept at 
poorhouses or other asylums at public expense and only later added to 
the prohibition any “idiot” or “insane person.”235 In 1958, the state 
passed an amendment which provided “no person who has a guardian 
. . . by reason of mental incapacity, appointed by a court of competent 
                                                                                                                      
229 See id. at 52. The court was particularly disturbed by the fact that a person under 
guardianship because of mental retardation would unconditionally be allowed to vote 
regardless of whether his mental disability diminished his capacity to understand the na-
ture and effect of voting. See id. 
230 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 55. The court related that in 1999, the United States De-
partment of Health and Human Services released the first Surgeon General’s Report on 
Mental Illness, which defined mental illness as “a term that collectively refers to all diag-
nosable mental disorders.” See id. at 54 (quoting U.S. Dep’t of Health & Human Serv., 
supra note 203, at 5) The court continued, “Mental disorders are health conditions that 
are characterized by alteration in thinking, mood or behavior (or some combination 
thereof) associated with distress and/or impaired functioning.” Id. (quoting U.S. Dep’t of 
Health & Human Serv., supra note 203, at 5). The court reasoned that should a state 
adopt such a broad modern definition as its basis for exclusion from voting eligibility it 
would risk excluding those who have some disorder, such as an eating disorder, but none-
theless possess a genuine understanding of the nature and effect of voting. See id. at 55. 
231 Id. at 56. 
232 See id. at 50–51. 
233 See 499 F.3d 803, 805 (8th Cir. 2007). 
234 See id. 
235 See id. at 806; Colker, supra note 23, at 1449. 
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jurisdiction . . . shall be entitled to vote.”236 The amendment’s aim was 
to give polling officials a concrete standard for determining who could 
be disqualified.237 The state’s implementing statute, however, provided 
a different standard that prohibited persons, “adjudged incapacitated” 
from registering to vote.238 
 The named plaintiff, Robert Scaletty, had been diagnosed with 
schizophrenia and, in 1999, was placed under a full order of protection 
in accordance with procedures established in Missouri law.239 Although 
his guardianship order reserved his right to vote, he was subsequently 
denied the right by election officials who explained that state law does 
not allow individuals under such an order to vote.240 After Scaletty be-
came party to the case in January 2005, however, the Kansas City Board 
of Election Commissioners sent his guardian a voter identification card 
and advised that he would be eligible to vote in the future.241 
 The plaintiffs mounted a facial attack against the Missouri consti-
tutional and statutory provisions, arguing that they constituted a cate-
gorical ban on voting for persons under guardianship.242 They argued 
that the bare term, “adjudged incapacitated,” of the statute could be 
read to implicate a far broader class of individuals than those excluded 
by Article VIII § 2 of the Missouri Constitution, including those placed 
under guardianship by reason of physical disability.243 
 The district court in this case explained that “difficulty arises in 
determining whether people who have been adjudged incompetent 
can, with or without accommodation, meet the essential eligibility re-
quirements for voting,” and it concluded that some could, and some 
could not.244 The court examined the totality of Missouri law to reach 
its conclusion.245 It found that Missouri law requires an “individualized 
determination of the individual’s mental capacity and entry of an order 
that is no more limiting than necessary to protect the individual.”246 
                                                                                                                      
236 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 805. 
237 See id. at 806. 
238 See Mo. Ann. Stat. § 115.133.2 (2008); Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 806. 
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241 See id. 
242 See id. at 808. 
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244 See Prye v. Carnahan, No. 04–4248–CV–C–ODS, 2006 WL 1888639, at *5 (W.D. Mo. 
July 7, 2006). 
245 See id. 
246 See Mo. Rev. Stat. § 475.078.3 (2008) (allowing the probate court to find and enter 
an order recognizing that a person is incompetent as to some matters and competent as to 
others); Carnahan, 2006 WL 1888639, at *6. In reaching this conclusion, the court was 
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The court grounded its logic upon a provision that empowered and 
obligated a probate judge to tailor an order of protection to the needs 
of the ward and not impose limits that are greater than necessary.247 
Yet, the opinion noted that its conclusion might have been different “if 
the entire sum and substance of Missouri law dictated that any person 
with a legally appointed guardian” could not vote.248 The court be-
lieved that such a situation might violate the ADA.249 
 On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth 
Circuit, the plaintiffs renewed their argument that Missouri’s constitu-
tion and implementing statute had created a categorical ban on voting 
for persons under guardianship.250 The court recognized that if the 
plaintiffs’ contentions were true, the statute would not fare well under 
close equal protection scrutiny.251 Yet, the court was confident that the 
Missouri Supreme Court would read the inconsistent statutory terms 
the same in light of a firm state policy to construe liberally the right of 
suffrage.252 It observed that, taken together, the statutes cited preserve 
the right to vote for partially incapacitated individuals, unless the court 
specifies otherwise, and deny the right to vote for totally incapacitated 
individuals, unless the court specifies otherwise.253 Further, as written, 
                                                                                                                      
persuaded that “the net effect is to afford the person the protection needed and allow him 
or her to operate without the strictures of an order of protection with respect to those 
aspects of life for which protection is not required—including, if appropriate in a given 
case, the right to vote.” See id. 
247 See Carnahan, 2006 WL 1888639, at *4. The court relied on the Missouri statute 
which read: 
A person who has been adjudicated incapacitated . . . shall be presumed to be 
incompetent. A person who has been adjudicated partially incapacitated . . . 
shall be presumed to be competent. The court . . . may determine that an in-
capacitated . . . or particularly incapacitated . . . person is incompetent for 
some purposes and competent for other purposes. 
Mo. Rev. Stat. § 475.078.3. 
248 See Carnahan, 2006 WL 1888639, at *6. In which case the law would not account for 
the individual’s unique abilities and limitations upon making a decision resulting in the 
denial of the right to vote. See id. 
249 Id. 
250 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808. 
251 See id. 
252 See id. at 806. 
253 See Mo. Rev. Stat. §§ 475.010, 475.078 (2008); Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 806. Like the 
district court, the circuit court considered that the Missouri Probate Code contains differ-
ent provisions for an “incapacitated person” and a person only “partially incapacitated,” 
the main distinction being that full incapacity imposes “all legal disabilities provided by 
law, except to the extent specified in the order of adjudication.” See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 
806. This convinced the court that the partially incapacitated individual would be subject 
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the law creates a presumption that one has the right to vote until ad-
judged incapacitated.254 
 Unfortunately, due to standing, the court refused to address the 
plaintiffs’ proffered evidence of the very same type of categorical exclu-
sion that was present in Doe.255 The court held that the Missouri Protec-
tion and Advocacy Services, Inc. (MOPAS) had no standing to bring 
these allegations of discrimination, despite representing four individuals 
who were denied the right to vote because they were under full guardi-
anship orders.256 Nevertheless, the court did not hesitate to condemn 
categorical denials of the right to vote based solely on one’s status with-
out considering one’s actual understanding of the nature and effect of 
voting.257 
D. Lane, Doe, and Carnahan Provide a Strong Incentive for States to Develop 
a Clear and Fair Standard for Voter Eligibility 
 Even if the states that categorically exclude persons based upon 
their mental disabilities choose to ignore the trend toward facilitating 
the inclusion of the mentally disabled in communities, they must now 
reconcile their election law with the demands of the Constitution and 
federal government in light of the foregoing court decisions.258 Lane 
equipped advocates with a powerful tool which bolsters the historically 
denigrated right to vote of persons with mental disabilities.259 Lane also 
sent a clarion call to states, informing them that failing to accommo-
date persons with disabilities by removing barriers to their participation 
in society and full enjoyment of our Constitution’s guarantees can con-
stitute discrimination.260 Further, Doe struck down a state’s election law 
and demanded that a new standard for eligibility be developed based 
                                                                                                                      
only to “such legal disabilities and restraints on personal liberty as are necessary to pro-
mote and protect the well-being of the individual.” See id. 
254 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 806–07. 
255 See id. at 810. 
256 See id. 809–10. Dr. Paul S. Appelbaum, cited infra for his work toward the develop-
ment of a structured assessment of voting capacity, conducted the evaluation of the MO-
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Appellants at 8, 11, Mo. Prot. & Advocacy Serv., Inc. v. Carnahan, 499 F.3d 803 (8th Cir. 
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257 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808. 
258 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524, 531–34; Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808; Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 
38, 51, 56, 59. 
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upon an individual’s actual understanding of the nature and effect of 
voting.261 Finally, Carnahan reaffirmed that states will not be able to rely 
upon election laws which in effect categorically exclude persons based 
upon their status.262 States cannot remain blind to the change embod-
ied in these recent cases; they must affirmatively work toward facilitat-
ing the right to vote for persons with mental disabilities and exclude 
only individuals a court finds incapacitated because the potential voters 
genuinely lack an understanding of the nature and effect of voting, as 
determined by a clear and fair standard.263 
Conclusion 
 Today, mentally disabled people who retain a fundamental under-
standing of the nature and effect of voting such that they are able to 
make choices are barred from doing so in several states.264 Conse-
quently, these people are denied the means by which to effectuate their 
legal rights and a voice in government—rights guaranteed in the Con-
stitution. These denials violate equal protection as well as Title II of the 
Americans with Disabilities Act and cannot persist.265 
 A national trend away from this pernicious discrimination has 
been given force through opinions like Lane, Doe, and Carnahan.266 The 
law of this country demands a right to vote even for those suffering 
from mental disabilities. States should facilitate the independent exer-
cise of voting. Though states have some discretion to exclude those 
who are mentally incapacitated, they must create clear and fair stan-
dards based on a low threshold that take into account the ability to un-
derstand the nature and effect of voting.267 These standards should be 
applied by courts in order to guarantee due process and equal protec-
tion under the law. Accordingly, all states should assist those who desire 
to exercise the right to vote and must assure that they are not arbitrarily 
denied and excluded. 
                                                                                                                      
261 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56. 
262 See Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808. 
263 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524, 531–34; Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808; Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 
33, 51, 56, 59; ADA Restoration Act Hearing, supra note 69, at 12, 26. 
264 See Hurme & Appelbaum, supra note 39, at 956. Hurme and Appelbaum found, as 
of 2007, that the laws of Arizona, Hawaii, Mississippi, Nevada, Virginia, West Virginia, and 
Wyoming resulted in categorical exclusions. See id. at 61 n.161. 
265 See Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 56. 
266 See Lane, 541 U.S. at 524; Carnahan, 499 F.3d at 808; Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 51, 
56, 59. 
267 Doe, 156 F. Supp. 2d at 33, 51, 56, 59. 
  
INSERTED BLANK PAGE 
